

IN CONVENTION.

MONDAY, *September 17, 1787.*

Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled; and that it is the opinion of this Convention that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legislature, for their assent and ratification; and that each convention, assenting to and ratifying the same, should give notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this Convention, that, as soon as the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified the same, and a day on which electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that, after such publication, the electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected; that the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the President, and should transmit their votes, certified, signed, sealed, and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled; that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the time and place assigned, that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for President; and that, after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without delay, proceed to execute this Constitution

By the unanimous order of the Convention

G. WASHINGTON, *President.*

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SIR: We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most advisable.

The friends of our country have long seen and desired that the power of making war, peace, and treaties; that of levying money, and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union; but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident: hence results the necessity of a different organization

It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend, as well on situation and circumstances, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision, the line between those rights which must be surrendered and those which may be reserved; and, on the pre-